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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the design of an active fault tolerant
control system applicable to autonomous flight. The system comprises
a nonlinear model predictive based controller integrated with an un-
scented Kalman filter for fault detection and identification. We apply
the fault tolerant control system design to a generic aircraft model, and
simulate a failed engine scenario. The results show that the system cor-
rectly identifies the fault within seconds of occurrence and updates the
nonlinear model predictive controller which is then able to reallocate
control authority to the healthy actuators based upon up to date fault
information.
1 Introduction
Fault tolerant flight control is a very active area of research, however the
work has concentrated on large manned aircraft with little work being done
for unmanned air vehicles. In this paper, we fill this gap by developing
an active fault tolerant control system for autonomous flight consisting of
a nonlinear model predictive control (NMPC) based controller integrated
with a fault detection and identification (FDI) system. The FDI developed
here uses an unscented Kalman filter (UKF) that actively seeks to predict
faults in the system and provides parameter updates to the NMPC controller
for reconfiguration. We successfully demonstrate the ability of our design to
identify engine failure and use the healthy actuators to continue the mission.
Most of the FTC schemes currently in use consist of a combination of
two or more control methods. For example the FTC system developed
by the Intelligent Flight Control System (IFCS) F-15 program at NASA
([7], [8]) is based on nonlinear dynamic inversion augmented with a neural
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network to compensate for inversion errors and changes in aircraft dynamics
due to damage or failure of a primary control surface. Another example
of combined methods for FTC is work conducted by Shin and Gregory [9],
with the FTC method based on robust gain scheduling (GS) control concepts
using a linear parameters varying (LPV) control synthesis for civil transport
aircraft. Yang and Lum’s [10] solution, tested on simulation models of the
F-16 aircraft with stuck actuator faults, bases the FTC on H∞ and peak-
to-peak gain performance indices in a multiobjective optimisation setting
with the algorithms based on linear matrix inequalities (LMIs). The active
FTC method developed by Yu and Jiang [11] models the impairments as
a polytopic linear paramater varying (LPV) system. Ye et. al [12] use a
linearised model of the F-18 (longitudinal motion only) with the FTC based
on H∞ in an LMI framework similar to Yang and Lum [10].
Our FTC system is based on only one method, nonlinear MPC, which
is used in both the fault free and the fault cases. Due to the inherent fault
tolerant capabilities of NMPC [14], the system is capable of control config-
uration without the need for another control scheme. The model developed
for this work is detailed in section 2. This is followed by a description of
the NMPC based FTC system in section 3. In this section the simulations
assume that FDI information is provided and the results show that our de-
sign is able to reallocate control distribution in the event of an actuator
failure. Section 4 details the development of a UKF based FDI scheme. The
results of this section reveal that there are many issues relating to observ-
ability which need to be addressed. This section identifies areas for further
research. The order of the model is reduced in section 5 and the fault simu-
lated is loss of engine failure. The results show that our FTC system design
successfully identifies the fault and redistributes control allocation to the
healthy actuators.
2 Model Description
The system given in figure 1 was modelled in MATLAB/Simulink with a
full 6DoF aircraft model.
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Figure 1: Aircraft System with FTC
The plant model used here doubles as the navigation model with the
guidance system provided by Williams [15]. The Dryden Wind Turbulence
model from the Aerospace Blockset [16] was used to model wind and turbu-
lence. The guidance subsystem is supplied with a series of way points and
provides the controller with angular rate information calculating the angular
rates required to maintain the reference path. The inner loops consist of two
controllers, an NMPC controller to control angular rates and a speed control
loop, a simple PI controller, to maintain a desired speed. An integrator is
also implemented to calculate the integrated errors in the angular rates.
The state vector of the aircraft plant model is:
x = [xN xE xD VN VE VD φ θ ψ p q r]
ᵀ , (1)
where xN , xE , xD are north, east and down position coordinates respec-
tively, given in an earth fixed tangent frame, called the navigation frame
(or NED frame), denoted by the subscript n, (see figure 2). The NED is
an Earth fixed frame, with the origin located at a point on the Earth. In
practice this origin is defined at the point where the aircraft is initialised
for flight. The vectors VN , VE , VD are the components of the velocity vector
in the north, east, and down directions respectively, φ, θ, ψ are the aircraft
orientation angles roll, pitch and yaw respectively and, p, q, r are the roll,
pitch and yaw angular rates respectively.
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Figure 2: Aircraft Coordinate Frames
A specific aircraft model is required for the development of a fault tol-
erant controller. The generic aircraft model developed here for control law
design and validation is based on the McDonnell Douglas F-4 aircraft [17].
The generic aircraft model developed for this work has the same aero-
dynamic characteristics as the F-4 aircraft but with the following mass and
size properties: Wing Area S = 20m, Mean Aerodynamic Chord c¯ = 3m,
C.G location xc.g = 0, C.G reference location xc.g.ref = 0, Weight 1,177
(kg), IX = 2, 257kg.m
2), IY = 11, 044kg.m
2, IZ = 12, 636kg.m
2) and IXZ =
106kg.m2.
The expressions for the non-dimensional force and moment equations are
given in the appendix along with the thrust model used. The controls for
the aircraft model are throttle (δth), elevator (δe), aileron (δa) and rudder
(δr), with the control vector given by:
u = [δth, δa, δe, δr]
ᵀ . (2)
3 Fault Tolerant Flight Control
The state vector of the NMPC controller is given by:
xnmpc = [p, q, r, Ip, Iq, Ir, δe, δa, δr, ∆δe, ∆δa, ∆δr]
ᵀ , (3)
where p, q and r are the roll rate, pitch rate and yaw rate respectively, Ip,
Iq and Ir are respectively, the integrated errors in p, q and r used to minimise
the steady state errors, δe, δa and δr are the elevator, aileron and rudder
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deflections respectively and ∆δe, ∆δa and ∆δr are the elevator, aileron and
rudder rates.
The prediction model of the nonlinear MPC controller is as follows:
p˙ = (c1 r + c2 p+ c4 heng) q + q¯ S b (c3Cl + c4Cn) , (4)
q˙ = (c5 p− c7 heng) r − c6
(
p2 − r2)+ q¯ S c¯ c7Cm, (5)
r˙ = (c8 p− c2 r + c9 heng) q + q¯ S b (c4Cl + c9Cn) , (6)
I˙p = pˆ− pdem, (7)
I˙q = qˆ − qdem, (8)
I˙r = rˆ − rdem, (9)
where pˆ, qˆ and rˆ are the predicted angular rates and pdem, qdem and
rdem are the demanded angular rates. The terms c1 to c7 are the moments
of inertia as defined in [17]. heng is the distance of the engine from the center
of gravity and is taken to be 0m and q¯ is the dynamic pressure. Cl, Cm and
Cn are the non-dimensional moment coefficients and CX CY and CZ are the
non-dimensional force coefficients.
A pseudospectral discretisation method is used [1] and the following
control problem is solved at each time step:
min
x,u
Hp
2
j=N+1∑
j=1
(∥∥ω(j)− ωdem(j)∥∥2Qω + ∥∥I˙(j)∥∥2QI
+
∥∥∆u(j)∥∥2
Qu
+
∥∥aN (j)∥∥2Qa
)
w(j),
(10)
subject to (
tf − t0
2
)
Dj,kxj − x˙j = 0, (11)
ω(j0)− ωdem(j0) = 0, (12)
xlb ≤ x ≤ xub, (13)
ulb ≤ u ≤ uub, (14)
∆ulb ≤ ∆u ≤ ∆uub, (15)
where DN is a spectral differentiation matrix [1], N refers to the number of
discretisation (or coincidence) points, t0 and tf are the initial and final times
of the prediction horizon window and the term I is the vector of integrated
errors . The state vector x is defined in (3). ∆u are the control input rates
and aN are the accelerations in the navigation frame. The constraints on
the states: p: None, q: None, r: None, Ip: None, Iq: None, Ir: None, dA:
±20 deg / sec, dE : ±20 deg / sec, dR: ±20 deg / sec, ∆dA: ±200 deg / sec,
∆dE : ±200 deg / sec and ∆dR: ±200 deg / sec. Qω, QI , Qu and Qa are
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diagonal weighting matrices with the following values along the diagonals
1, 0.000001, 0.05 and 1 respectively. These weighting values were chosen
through trial and error.
A prediction window length of 1 second was used with 16 coincidence
points. A 1 second window was deemed sufficient for the purposes of angular
rate following as it is assumed that the angular rate demands are constant
across the window length. This is a reasonable assumption as the angular
rates do not change significantly after 1 second.
3.1 Fault Simulation
The concept behind the fault tolerant controller design for the 6DoF model
is based on monitoring the control derivatives. The non-dimensional aero-
dynamic coefficients for the forces and moments given in appendix I are
made up of a series of aerodynamic and control derivatives. For example
the term −6.54 × 10−3δe in the pitching moment coefficient represents the
pitch control derivative, Cmδe , the contribution of the elevator control in-
put on the pitching moment coefficient. In the example given above the
value −6.54 × 10−3 is specific to the given aircraft as are all the derivative
values given in appendix I. For any aircraft these values are obtained via
experimental testing or computational fluid dynamic techniques, and as the
derivatives are affected by any physical change in the control surface any
change in a control derivative would indicate a fault.
For the simulation results given in subsection 3.2 the faults are simulated
by reducing the efficiency of the control surface. The primary role of an ele-
vator is to provide pitch control, so its largest contribution is on the pitching
moment, and therefore a change in the Cmδe derivative would indicate an
elevator fault. The aileron contributes primarily to the rolling moment Cl
and the control derivative associated with the aileron from equation (31) is
Clδa = 6.1× 10−4. Finally the rudder has the biggest impact on the yawing
moment, Cn, and the associated control derivative from equation (33) is
Cnδr = −9.0× 10−4. To simulate a fault in a control surface the respective
control derivative is reduced.
3.2 Numerical Results
To investigate the effectiveness of the NMPC controller design as a fault
tolerant controller the aircraft was required to fly the trajectory given in
figure 3.
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Figure 3: 6DoF Reference Trajectory
Three different scenarios were set up:
Scenario 1: faulty elevator: 70% reduction in efficiency 20 seconds
into flight,
Scenario 2: faulty aileron: 80% reduction in efficiency 20 seconds
into flight,
Scenario 3: faulty rudder: 60% reduction in efficiency 20 seconds
into flight,
Each scenario is run with and without FDI information. The FDI in-
formation when used is assumed and has not been modelled. It is assumed
that the FDI subsystem is capable of providing the time of fault and the
efficiency of the control surface.
3.3 Analysis
Figure 4 presents the plots for the control surface activity given an elevator
with 70% reduction in efficiency. Figure 5 presents a 10 second plot to
show a close up of the elevator activity. The plots show that without any
knowledge of the fault the activity in the elevator decreases after 20 seconds
and there is very little change in the aileron and rudder activity once the
fault occurs. When FDI information is provided however the knowledge of
the fault prompts the control surfaces to work harder to compensate for the
fault. This is seen in all three control surfaces which at various times during
the flight are all operating at the constraints.
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Figure 4: Faulty Elevator: Control Surface Activity, constraints (red), con-
trol surface activity (blue). Left column: no FDI information, Right column:
with FDI information
Figure 5: Faulty Elevator: Control Surface Activity (zoomed), constraints
(red), control surface activity (blue). Left column: no FDI information,
Right column: with FDI information
The angular rate plots are shown in figure 6. A fault in the elevator
directly affects the pitch rate q, and without any FDI information the con-
troller is unable to meet the pitch rate demands, however the roll rate and
yaw rate demands are followed very closely. With knowledge of the faults
there is an increase in the demanded angular rates and the controller shows
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a significant improvement in performance in being able to follow the de-
manded rates.
Figure 6: Faulty Elevator: Angular Rates, demanded (red), actual (blue).
Left column: no FDI information, Right column: with FDI information
The trajectories flown by the aircraft with a faulty elevator, with and
without FDI information, are provided in figure 7. The results show that
in the absence of FDI information the aircraft successfully flies the trajec-
tory, however providing FDI information caused the simulated trajectory to
diverge from the reference trajectory. This result shows that the controller
behaves exactly as expected. The controller has been designed to maintain
the angular rate demands not the reference trajectory. The angular rate
plots show that with the FDI information there is an increase in perfor-
mance of the controller in terms of tracking the angular rate demands. The
trajectory plots show that the simulated trajectory produced with FDI in-
formation causes the aircraft to drop below ground level which is physically
impossible. This is a result of not applying constraints on the aircraft po-
sition vector. Hence unless a parameter is explicitly penalised in the cost
function and/or constraints placed upon the parameters the controller will
use everything available to it to achieve what is being demanded of it.
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Figure 7: Faulty Elevator: 6DoF Trajectory
The same plots were produced for scenario 2 but have been omitted due
to space constraints. The aileron and rudder are primarily used to control
the lateral motion of the aircraft while the elevator controls the longitudinal
motion. Thus the results showed very little change in the behaviour of the
elevator when FDI information is provided compared to no FDI information.
The rudder and aileron on the other hand when provided with FDI informa-
tion increase their activity after the occurrence of the fault to compensate
for the loss in efficiency and operate closer to the constraints.
Similar behaviour was present in the angular rate plots. There was little
or no change in the pitch response of the aircraft once FDI information is
provided compared when FDI is absent. In the case of no FDI the actual
roll rate is lower than the demand, however once information on the fault
is provided tracking performance increases. This is also true for the yaw
rate response. In the presence of an aileron fault roll and yaw rate demands
increase to sustain lateral motion.
The trajectory plots showed that in the case where FDI information is
provided the aircraft was seen to deviate slightly off the path. The deviation
is not as significant in the event of an aileron fault as the rudder also helps
to control the lateral motion of the aircraft hence providing an extra degree
of redundancy.
The same plots were produced for scenario 3 with a 60% reduction in
efficiency in the rudder and it was again observed that as the elevator has
very little influence on lateral motion, there was little change in elevator
activity with no difference between the no FDI and with FDI cases. The
rudder was seen to be pushed to its lower limit and the aileron increased in
the negative direction causing the aircraft to bank more to the left.
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A faulty rudder was seen to have no effect on the angular rate demands.
Tracking performance was the same both with and without FDI information.
This was translated in the trajectory plots which illustrated that the aircraft
closely followed the flight path with and without FDI information.
Another point to note is that the non-dimensional force and moment
coefficients given in appendix I are only valid for angle of attack α ≤ 150.
Plots of α were produced for all scenarios and the results showed that α
never went above 150. Models of α > 150 are also given in [17], so to
cover all flight envelopes multiple α models could have been incorporated or
constraints could have been placed on α to ensure 150 is never exceeded. In
our work, we added stall speed constraints to the NMPC controller and the
results show that stall speed was never encountered.
Overall the results of our 6DoF analysis show that NMPC design as
a fault tolerant controller is viable, showing that in the absence of FDI
information the controller is capable of allocating control authority to the
appropriate actuators to fly the aircraft on the given flight path. This is a
display of the inherent fault tolerant capabilities of NMPC. Turning on FDI
updates improved the tracking performance of the controller. The results
did however show that unless a quantity is penalised in the cost function,
and/or constraints are applied, the controller will push the limits to achieve
the desired outcome. In this case the controller was specifically designed to
track angular rate demands, hence providing FDI information resulted in an
increase in tracking performance in the event of a control surface fault.
The next section will look at the design of an FDI filter to be incorporated
into the FTC developed in this section.
4 Fault Detection and Identification
The fault detection concepts from [2] are implemented here for the full 6DoF
aircraft model and designs for the UKF are presented. To design the filter
a PID controller for the aircraft was designed and implemented before inte-
grating the filter with the NMPC controller.
A traditional PID controller was used to control the aircraft through
the range of manoeuvres required to test and tune the filter. The PID
control method, although not optimal in terms of performance, was quick
to implement and tune to the level required.
The proposed fault detection scheme is based on the principle that a fail-
ure in any one of the control surfaces would directly affect the corresponding
control derivative. Hence changes in the control derivatives would indicate
a fault has occurred, while at the same time the filter would provide the
controller with estimates of the derivatives. Furthermore, up to date esti-
mates of the derivatives will allow the NMPC controller to perform at its
optimum.
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The force and moment equations given in appendix I show that there
are a total of 24 control derivative. These are listed in Table 1.
Table 1: Control Derivatives
Derivative Value Derivative Value
CXdE1 9.5× 10−4 CldR2 4.5× 10−6
CXdE2 8.5× 10−7 CldE1 5.24× 10−5
CYdE1 1.75× 10−4 CmdE1 6.54× 10−3
CYdR1 1.55× 10−3 CmdE2 8.49× 10−5
CYdR2 8× 10−6 CmdE3 3.74× 10−6
CZdE1 4.76× 10−3 CmdA1 3.5× 10−5
CZdE2 3.3× 10−5 CndA1 1.4× 10−5
CZdA1 7.5× 10−5 CndA2 7.0× 10−6
CldA1 6.1× 10−4 CndE1 8.73× 10−5
CldA2 2.5× 10−5 CndE2 8.7× 10−6
CldA3 2.6× 10−6 CndR1 9.0× 10−4
CldR1 −2.3× 10−4 CndR2 4.0× 10−6
To test the filters the aircraft was required to achieve the roll angle
demands given in figure 8.
Figure 8: 6DoF Motion Filter Tests - Roll Angle Demands
Initially a 30 state UKF filter was designed where the states comprised
of three accelerations (ax, ay, az), three angular rates (p, q, r) and the 24
control derivatives given above. The measurements were of the body accel-
eration and angular rates (as would be provided by an IMU sensor). All the
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derivatives were normalised to 1 hence the states of the control derivative
were set to 1. The results of the acceleration and angular rate innovations
are given in figures 9 and 10 respectively. The results show that the filter
does an excellent job of predicting the accelerations and angular rates as the
filter predictions align perfectly with the measurements of acceleration and
angular rates. The estimates of the control derivatives are shown in figure
11. Since all derivatives were normalised the estimates should all have a
value of 1. However, as the plot shows, the filter was unable to correctly
estimate the value of the derivatives, as many of the states in the filter are
unobservable.
Figure 9: Accelerations - 30 State Vector, left column estimates (red mea-
sured, blue predicted), right column innovations (2σ uncertainty bounds
(red dashed) and innovations (blue).
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Figure 10: Angular Rates - 30 State Vector, left column estimates (red
measured, blue predicted), right column innovations (2σ uncertainty bounds
(red dashed) and innovations (blue).
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Figure 11: Control Derivative Estimates - 30 State Vector. Each line cor-
responds to a normalised value of a control derivative estimate and should
have a value of 1.
To address the issue of observability the number of states was reduced
to 19; 3 accelerations, 3 angular rates and 13 control derivatives. This was
achieved by having one control derivative estimate per force/moment for
a particular control surface. For example, the control derivatives given in
table 1 show that there are 2 CX control derivatives which are due to the
elevator CXdE1 and CXdE2; the 19 state filter has only one derivative CXdE
used to represent both of the CX derivatives due to the elevator. Thus the
contributions of each control surface in the force and moment equations are
grouped together in this manner reducing the number of control derivative
states from 24 to 13. The plots of angular rates and accelerations have been
omitted due to space constraints, with the results again showing close to per-
fect compliance between prediction and measurement. However while plots
of the control derivative estimates did show an improvement in estimates
the issue of unobservable states was still evident.
To further address this issue the number of filter states was again re-
duced, from 19 to 12. For control surface failure the most important deriva-
tives are deemed to be CldA1 for aileron, CmdE1 for elevator and CndR1 for
the rudder, and the trim values Cl0, Cm0 and Cn0. From the equations
given in Appendix I the trim values corresponding to aileron, elevator and
rudder are Cl0 = 0, Cm0 = −6.61× 10−3 and Cn0 = 0 respectively.
The plots obtained of acceleration and angular rate estimates for the 12
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state filter showed that the angular rate estimations were excellent however,
the filter was unable to make correct estimates of acceleration. This was
to be expected because the filter states are unrelated to force, and are all
moment related terms. The control derivatives CldA1, CmdE1 and CndR1 are
normalised to 1 as is the trim value for Cm0 and the estimates of these were
plotted. Results showed big discrepancies between the actual and estimated
values for the elevator terms.
Due to the continuing presence of unobservable states the state vector
was once more reduced by removing the acceleration terms resulting in a 9
state filter. The measurements supplied to the filter were only of the angular
rates. The acceleration terms were removed due to the errors present in the
estimates. The angular rate estimates and innovations were plotted and as
expected, show that the filter predictions closely match the measurements.
It was evident however from the control derivative and trim estimate plot
that the observability issue was still present.
In a final attempt to solve the observability issue three separate filters
were developed, one each for roll, pitch and yaw with each filter, a 3 state
filter. The states for the roll only filter are p, CldA1 and Cn0, the pitch only
filter states are q, CmdE1 and Cm0 and the yaw only filter has r, CndR1
and Cn0 as states. The angular rate estimates were obtained and again
showed compliance with the measurements. Separating the filters caused
slight improvement in the control derivative and trim estimates however the
observability problem was still present particularly for the Cm0 term. This
was to be expected as the aircraft lateral dynamics have been excited by
the demanded roll inputs given in figure 8 hence the estimates of the deriva-
tives related to the later dynamics are more accurate than the longitudinal
motion derivatives. For good estimates it is necessary to excite the aircraft
dynamics.
The results obtained in the previous section illustrate that if the NMPC
controller could be provided with estimates of the control derivatives it would
assist the controller in allocating control authority appropriately. For this
reason a UKF filter was designed in this section to provide real time es-
timates. However results showed that many of the control derivatives are
unobservable. Many attempts were made to tackle this issue, however all
proved to be unsuccessful. The 3 filter solution was integrated with the
NMPC controller to test the full active fault tolerant control system. Re-
sults for these tests have not been supplied as the incorrect estimates of the
filter caused the solution from the controller to diverge. Further investiga-
tions into the full 6DoF fault tolerant controller are required.
As the main objective of this work is to demonstrate fault tolerant flight
control, the next section looks at the longitudinal motion of the aircraft with
integrated FDI to form a full active fault tolerant flight control system.
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5 Engine Failure - Loss of Power
The loss of power on an aircraft due to engine failure can result in a catas-
trophic breakdown of the system if left unattended. This section demon-
strates the use of the active FTC system design as a fault tolerant flight
controller in the event of an engine failure.
The FTC system is used to control the longitudinal motion of the air-
craft. The design comprises of a UKF filter to monitor the thrust level of
the air vehicle. Fault detection logic is built into the filter and once the
decision is made that there is a loss of power the filter estimates are fed to
the NMPC controller for reconfiguration.
The filter design is detailed in the next subsection followed by the details
of the controller design in the subsection after. Finally numerical results are
presented.
5.1 Filter Design
The filter design process consists of the development of a simple PID thrust
controller. The NMPC and filter designs were independently constructed
and tested then integrated into the final design.
5.1.1 UKF FDI Filter
The UKF filter is designed to estimate the amount of thrust used by the
aircraft. The filter states are:
xukf = [VN , VD, θ, T ], (16)
where T is thrust (see appendix II for the thrust model). The measure-
ment vector is:
xukf = [VEAS, vD, θ], (17)
where VEAS is equivalent airspeed of the aircraft at sea level whereas VT
is the true airspeed at altitude. For this work the aircraft is assumed to be
flying low enough for VEAS = VT .
The weighting matrices Q and R were set to:
Q =

(5 ∆t 0.05)2 0 0 0
0 (5 ∆t 0.05)2 0 0
0 0 (0.1 ∆ t)2 0
0 0 0 (6500 ∆t 0.3)2
 , (18)
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R =
(0.05)2 0 00 (0.05)2 0
0 0 (0.017)2
 , (19)
where ∆t is the filter update rate 0.01 secs. The initial state vector and
covariance matrix are:
x(0) = [50, 0 0.04247, 1507.7526]ᵀ , P(0) =

(0.5)2 0 0 0
0 (0.5)2 0 0
0 0 (0.017)2 0
0 0 0 (315)2

(20)
5.1.2 Numerical Results
The following test cases were carried out to examine the filter performance:
Test 1: no fault,
Test 2: 70% loss of power 70 secs into flight,
Test 3: 90% loss of power 35 secs into flight,
Test 4: 50% loss of power 20 secs into flight.
The aircraft was required to fly the trajectory given in figure 12. The
effects of wind and turbulence have been taken into account as well as the
effect of noise on the measurements of VEAS, vd and θ, modelled as a normally
distributed random white noise.
Figure 12: Reference trajectory for longitudinal motion
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To analyse the performance of the filter the innovation covariance plots
were examined and are given in figures 13, 14 and 15 for VEAS, vd and θ
respectively. The results show that for all test cases the innovations are
well within the 2σ covariance bounds. The test case 3 where the thrust
level drops to 10% shows that after approximately 70 seconds the aircraft
is unable to maintain flight as there is not enough power hence the filter
diverges. The thrust estimates are given in figure 16 along with the actual
thrust applied to the aircraft. In each test case the filter does an excellent
job of estimating the thrust levels.
Figure 13: UKF VEAS Innovations - Longitudinal Model, ±2σ innovation
covariance bounds (red dashed lines), VEAS innovations (solid blue line)
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Figure 14: UKF VD Innovations - Longitudinal Model, ±2σ innovation co-
variance bounds (red dashed lines), VD innovations (solid blue line)
Figure 15: UKF θ Innovations - Longitudinal Model, ±2σ innovation co-
variance bounds (red dashed lines), θ innovations (solid blue line)
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Figure 16: UKF Thrust Estimates - Longitudinal Model
5.1.3 Fault Detection Logic
The premise behind our FTC design is the provision of the updates of the
power status to the NMPC controller to enable controller reconfiguration.
When an engine fails the amount of thrust available decreases. If this level
of thrust could be estimated and provided to the NMPC controller the max-
imum constraint on thrust can be updated and the controller can then al-
locate control authority to the control inputs accordingly. For this reason
it is important to detect the fault and to know when to begin feeding the
controller with filter estimates of thrust, hence the need for fault detection
logic.
The controller is designed (section 5.2) to calculate the optimal amount
of thrust to maintain a height demand and true airspeed. The filter on the
other hand estimates the thrust level currently used by the aircraft, hence
if the demand is greater than the estimate this would indicate an engine
failure.
The fault detection logic therefore comprises of checking whether the
thrust demand is higher than the thrust estimate. If this is true for a set
period of time then a fault has occurred and a flag is turned on indicating
that a fault has occurred and consequently the constraints must be updated
via the filter estimates. The filter outputs an estimate of the state as well
as the uncertainty on the estimate, so that the actual value of the state
as predicted by the filter is within plus or minus the uncertainty. For this
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reason a number of tests were performed to see whether the check should
include zero level of uncertainty, ±1σ uncertainty or ±2σ, with the results
given in figure 17. The results are based on a fault count of 200, i.e. when the
demand is greater than the thrust estimate the fault counter is incremented
by one, and when this counter exceeds 200 the fault flag switches from 0 to 1
indicating to the controller that the maximum constraint on thrust must be
updated with the filter estimate. The number of counts being set to 200 is
based purely on trial and error. The results show that the filter estimate plus
2σ uncertainty was able to correctly identify the fault within approximately
a couple of seconds of the fault occurring. The other uncertainty bounds as
well as the zero uncertainty case all indicated false detection of the fault,
that is the fault flag is set to true at the incorrect times. Note that a fault
was not detected for test case 4 even with a 2σ uncertainty bound. This is
because the thrust estimate plots (as shown in figure 16) indicate that in a
no fault case the aircraft requires no more than 50% of the maximum thrust
to maintain the given trajectory, hence the demand is at all times less than
the estimate.
Figure 17: UKF Fault Flag - Longitudinal Model
In the next subsection the complete active FTC system design for thrust
control is detailed.
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5.2 Controller Design
This section steps through the controller design for the active FTC system
for the longitudinal motion of the aircraft.
Pseudospectral discretisation [1] is applied to the controller design and
the NMPC state vector is:
xnmpc = [xD, VN , VD, θ, q, δthrust, δe, ∆δthrust ∆δe]
ᵀ , (21)
The following optimal control problem is solved at each time step:
min
x,u
Hp
2
j=N+1∑
j=1
(∥∥xD(j)− xDref(j)∥∥2Qx + ∥∥Vt(j)−Vtref(j)∥∥2QV T
+
∥∥VD(j)−VDref(j)∥∥2QVD + ∥∥∆δthrust∥∥2QT
+
∥∥∆δe∥∥2Qδe + ∥∥q∥∥2Qq + ∥∥aD∥∥2Qa
)
w(j),
(22)
subject to (
tf − t0
2
)
Dj,kxj − x˙j = 0, (23)
x(j0)− xdem(j0) = 0, (24)
xlb ≤ x ≤ xub, (25)
ulb ≤ u ≤ uub, (26)
∆ulb ≤ ∆u ≤ ∆uub, (27)
where VT and VTref are the actual and reference true airspeeds respec-
tively and the state vector x is defined in (21). Qx, QV T , QV D, QT , Qδe , Qq
and Qa are diagonal weighting matrices with the following values along the
diagonals 10, 5, 5, 0.001, 0.1, 0.01 and 0.01 respectively and the term w(j)
are the pseudospectral node weights [1]. The constraints applied are: xD: 1
to 300m, VN : 30 to 100 m/s, VD: ±3 m/s, θ: None, q: None, δe: ±20 deg,
∆δthrust: ±6500 N/s and ∆δe: ±200 deg/s.
The lower limit on thrust is 0 N while the upper limit changes throughout
the flight and is set to the maximum value of thrust based on the height
of the aircraft. Maximum thrust is calculated via equation (34). If a fault
has been detected and the fault flag described in section 5.1.3 is set to 1 the
upper constraint is set to the filter estimate of thrust plus a 2σ uncertainty.
The following scenarios were designed to test the fault tolerant control
system:
Scenario 1: no fault case
Scenario 2: engine failure - 65% power loss 30 secs into flight,
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Scenario 3: engine failure - 70% power loss 30 secs into flight.
Note: all test runs take into account the effect of wind.
Figures 18, 19 and 20 show the control inputs for scenarios 1, 2 and 3
respectively. The results for the thrust show a dip in the constraint value for
the upper thrust limits for scenarios 2 and 3 soon after 30 secs. This indicates
that the fault was correctly identified and the NMPC was reconfigured with
the information provided by the FDI filter. The uncertainty bounds in both
figures are slightly higher than the actual thrust applied due to the addition
of the 2σ uncertainty. Other values of σ were found to cause the controller
and hence the filter to diverge. Although the estimate is slightly above the
actual it is still in the vicinity of the actual thrust level and prompts the
controller to allocate more control authority to the other available actuators.
The results show that compared to the no fault case once a fault occurs the
elevator activity increases as the power decreases. Also the more severe the
fault the faster the detection time. This is evident from the fact that the
fault is detected earlier in the 70% power loss case compared to the 65% loss
of power case.
Figure 18: Active FTC Thrust Controller: Control Inputs - Scenario 1: No
Fault Case
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Figure 19: Active FTC Thrust Controller: Control Inputs - Scenario 2: 65%
Loss of Power Case
Figure 20: Active FTC Thrust Controller: Control Inputs - Scenario 3: 70%
Loss of Power Case
Figure 21 shows the true airspeed of the air vehicle. A true airspeed of
50m/s was demanded by the aircraft. In the case where there is 65% loss of
power the aircraft is unable to maintain the demanded true airspeed during
straight and level flight. Once the aircraft begins to descend the demanded
true airspeed is recovered. However in the case of 70% power loss there
is not enough power to maintain the demanded airspeed. Once the fault
occurs the airspeed begins to drop and reaches stall causing the aircraft to
25
lose control.
Figure 21: Active FTC Thrust Controller: True Airspeeds
The vertical speed (also known as climb rate) response is given in fig-
ure 22. In the 65% power loss case the response is very similar to the no
fault response. A 70% loss in power results in the aircraft being unable to
maintain speed and it descends to the ground.
Figure 22: Active FTC Thrust Controller: Climb Rates
The height profiles given in figure 23 show that even with a 65% loss in
power the aircraft is capable of maintaining the reference trajectory. How-
ever when the power decreases by another 5% the aircraft completes the
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climb to the highest demanded altitude but begins to descend half way
through straight and level flight.
Figure 23: Active FTC Thrust Controller: Height Profiles
In summary, we can see that the results obtained successfully demon-
strate the application of the active fault tolerant flight control system design.
The control system is able to detect an engine fault within 2-3 seconds of the
fault occurring, enabling reconfiguration of the NMPC controller to allow
reallocation of control authority to maintain the aircraft on the demanded
flight path within the aircraft limits. The controller works hard to achieve
the demands, however in the event where this is impossible this information
can be used to bring the aircraft back safely to the ground.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we effectively demonstrated the application of our active FTC
system design to flight control. The FTC system comprised of an NMPC
controller integrated with a UKF filter for fault detection. This is the first
time such a system has been applied within the context of fault tolerant flight
control. To assist the research a generic aircraft model was developed and the
active FTC system was applied to the 6DoF aircraft model. Research into
the application of the FTC system on a full 6Dof aircraft model identified
a number of areas for further research particularly in the design of the FDI
system. The FTC system was then applied to the longitudinal motion of the
aircraft where engine failure scenarios were simulated. The results obtained
show that the FTC system successfully identified the fault within seconds of
occurrence and re-allocated the control authority to healthy actuators based
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upon up to date fault information.
Appendix
6.0.1 Force and Moment Coefficients
For the F-4 at α ≤ 150 the non-dimensional force and moment coefficients
are given by:
CX = − 0.0434 + 2.93× 10−3α+ 2.53× 10−5β2 − 1.07× 10−6αβ2 + 9.5× 10−4δe
− 8.5× 10−7δeβ2 +
(
180qc¯
pi2Vt
)(
8.73× 10−3 + 0.001α− 1.75× 10−4α2) ,
(28)
CY = − 0.012β + 1.55× 10−3δr − 8× 10−6δrα
+
(
180b
pi2Vt
)(
2.25× 10−3p+ 0.0117r − 3.67× 10−4rα+ 1.75× 10−4rδe
)
,
(29)
CZ = − 0.131− 0.0538α− 4.76× 10−3δe − 3.3× 10−5δeα− 7.5× 10−5δa2
+
(
180qc¯
pi2Vt
)(−0.111 + 5.17× 10−3α− 1.1× 10−3α2) ,
(30)
Cl = − 5.98× 10−4β − 2.83× 10−4αβ + 1.51× 10−5α2β
− δa
(
6.1× 10−4 + 2.5× 10−5α− 2.6× 10−6α2)
+ δr
(−2.3× 10−4 + 4.5× 10−6α)
+
(
180b
pi2Vt
)(−4.2× 10−3p− 5.24× 10−4pα+ 4.36× 10−5pα2
+4.36× 10−4r + 1.05× 10−4rα+ 5.24× 10−5rδe
)
,
(31)
Cm = − 6.61× 10−3 − 2.67× 10−3α− 6.48× 10−5β2
− 2.65× 10−6αβ2 − 6.54× 10−3δe − 8.49× 10−5δeα
+ 3.74× 10−6δeβ2 − 3.5× 10−5δa2
+
(
180qc¯
pi2Vt
)(−0.0473− 1.57× 10−3α)+ (xc.g.ref − xc.g)CZ ,
(32)
28
Cn = 2.28× 10−3β + 1.79× 10−6β3 + 1.4× 10−5δa
+ 7.0× 10−6δaα− 9.0× 10−4δr + 4.0× 10−6δrα
+
(
180b
pi2Vt
)(−6.63× 10−5p− 1.92× 10−5pα+ 5.06× 10−6pα2
−6.06× 10−3r − 8.73× 10−5rδe + 8.7× 10−6rδeα
)
−
( c¯
b
)
(xc.g.ref − xc.g)CZ .
(33)
6.0.2 Thrust Model
The following thrust model [18] is used in this work:
hT =
H
3048
, (34)
Tmax = ((30.21− 0.668hT − 6.877hT 2 + 1.951hT 3 − 0.1512hT 4)
+
(
V t
vs
)
(−33.8 + 3.347hT + 18.13hT 2 − 5.865hT 3 + 0.4757hT 4)
+
(
V t
vs
)2
(100.8− 77.56hT + 5.441hT 2 + 2.864hT 3 − 0.3355hT 4)
+
(
V t
vs
)3
(−78.99 + 101.4hT − 30.28hT 2 + 3.236hT 3 − 0.1089hT 4)
+
(
V t
vs
)4
(18.74− 31.6hT + 12.04hT 2 − 1.785hT 3 + 0.09417hT 4))4448.22
20
,
(35)
T = Tmax δth, (36)
where vs is the speed of sound, 340.3m/s, H the height or the −xD
position of the aircraft, and δth.
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